Dan Williams 5c91dde131 x86/entry/64/compat: Clear registers for compat syscalls, to reduce speculation attack surface ... commit 6b8cf5cc9965673951f1ab3f0e3cf23d06e3e2ee upstream. At entry userspace may have populated registers with values that could otherwise be useful in a speculative execution attack. Clear them to minimize the kernel's attack surface. Originally-From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151787989697.7847.4083702787288600552.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com [ Made small improvements to the changelog. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>		2018-07-25 10:18:20 +02:00
..
syscalls
vdso	x86/vdso: Use static_cpu_has()	2018-07-17 11:31:45 +02:00
vsyscall
calling.h
common.c	x86/cpufeature: Carve out X86_FEATURE_*	2018-07-17 11:31:44 +02:00
entry_32.S	x86/cpufeature: Carve out X86_FEATURE_*	2018-07-17 11:31:44 +02:00
entry_64_compat.S	x86/entry/64/compat: Clear registers for compat syscalls, to reduce speculation attack surface	2018-07-25 10:18:20 +02:00
entry_64.S
Makefile
syscall_32.c
syscall_64.c
thunk_32.S
thunk_64.S