xen: Prevent buffer overflow in privcmd ioctl
commit 42d8644bd77dd2d747e004e367cb0c895a606f39 upstream. The "call" variable comes from the user in privcmd_ioctl_hypercall(). It's an offset into the hypercall_page[] which has (PAGE_SIZE / 32) elements. We need to put an upper bound on it to prevent an out of bounds access. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1246ae0bb992 ("xen: add variable hypercall caller") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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@ -215,6 +215,9 @@ privcmd_call(unsigned call,
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__HYPERCALL_DECLS;
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__HYPERCALL_5ARG(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5);
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if (call >= PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(hypercall_page[0]))
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return -EINVAL;
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stac();
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asm volatile(CALL_NOSPEC
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: __HYPERCALL_5PARAM
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