vhost: make sure log_num < in_num
commit 060423bfdee3f8bc6e2c1bac97de24d5415e2bc4 upstream. The code assumes log_num < in_num everywhere, and that is true as long as in_num is incremented by descriptor iov count, and log_num by 1. However this breaks if there's a zero sized descriptor. As a result, if a malicious guest creates a vring desc with desc.len = 0, it may cause the host kernel to crash by overflowing the log array. This bug can be triggered during the VM migration. There's no need to log when desc.len = 0, so just don't increment log_num in this case. Fixes: 3a4d5c94e959 ("vhost_net: a kernel-level virtio server") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Lidong Chen <lidongchen@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: ruippan <ruippan@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: yongduan <yongduan@tencent.com> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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@ -1910,7 +1910,7 @@ static int get_indirect(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq,
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/* If this is an input descriptor, increment that count. */
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if (access == VHOST_ACCESS_WO) {
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*in_num += ret;
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if (unlikely(log)) {
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if (unlikely(log && ret)) {
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log[*log_num].addr = vhost64_to_cpu(vq, desc.addr);
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log[*log_num].len = vhost32_to_cpu(vq, desc.len);
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++*log_num;
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@ -2046,7 +2046,7 @@ int vhost_get_vq_desc(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq,
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/* If this is an input descriptor,
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* increment that count. */
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*in_num += ret;
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if (unlikely(log)) {
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if (unlikely(log && ret)) {
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log[*log_num].addr = vhost64_to_cpu(vq, desc.addr);
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log[*log_num].len = vhost32_to_cpu(vq, desc.len);
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++*log_num;
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