samsung-klte: backport memfd_create() syscall (!479)
This brings in several patches needed to add support for a memfd_create() syscall into kernel version 3.4 from kernel version 3.17. This is required for running lxc >= 3.1.0-r1 with security patch that fixes CVE-2019-5736. In short, security issue was: in a privileged container root process could overwrite lxc-start executable by opening its file descriptor and rewriting executable contents. This is where memfd comes to help: you can create an in-memory file, copy your executable there, and place a set of SEALS to protect it from modifying at a deep level. Then you fexecve() that fd and you're safe. For example, pulseaudio also can benefit from having memfd_create() implemented. This backports the following commits from upstream linux: - dd37978c50bc8b354e5c4633f69387f16572fdac: cache the value of file_inode() in struct file commit from linux-3.10 to have an f_inode member inside struct file and a helper function file_inode() that is used in some of the following commits - 40e041a2c858b3caefc757e26cb85bfceae5062b shm: add sealing API from 3.17: security measure called SEALS, that you can put on memfd file to restrict operations on it - 9183df25fe7b194563db3fec6dc3202a5855839c shm: add memfd_create() syscall also from 3.17 - 503e6636b6f96056210062be703356f4253b6db9 asm-generic: add memfd_create system call to unistd.h - e57e41931134e09fc6c03c8d4eb19d516cc6e59b ARM: wire up memfd_create syscall The last two are needed to make the syscall visible/usable from userspace, one in generic context, other for ARM arch. The test program (https://github.com/minlexx/test_memfd/) was written to verify that this works. [ci:skip-build]: already built successfully in CI
This commit is contained in:
Alexey Min
Oliver Smith
parent
17ab67d2b6
commit
2fb18b5d30
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|
@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
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From 71846fb0e72ac8f7c05ca85f28b50cae4703acfc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2019 23:47:19 +0300
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Subject: [PATCH 1/5] cache the value of file_inode() in struct file
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Note that this thing does *not* contribute to inode refcount;
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it's pinned down by dentry.
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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---
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fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 3 ++-
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fs/file_table.c | 2 ++
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fs/open.c | 2 ++
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include/linux/fs.h | 7 +++++++
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4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
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index 6ef8c890a57..2b511f8a416 100644
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--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
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+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
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@@ -1844,10 +1844,11 @@ static inline bool f2fs_cp_error(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
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return is_set_ckpt_flags(sbi->ckpt, CP_ERROR_FLAG);
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}
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+/* Implementation of file_inode added to include/linux/fs.h
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static inline struct inode *file_inode(struct file *f)
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{
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return f->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
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-}
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+}*/
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static inline bool is_dot_dotdot(const struct qstr *str)
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{
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diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c
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index a01710a6ff3..07838af0737 100644
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--- a/fs/file_table.c
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+++ b/fs/file_table.c
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@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ struct file *alloc_file(struct path *path, fmode_t mode,
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return NULL;
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file->f_path = *path;
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+ file->f_inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
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file->f_mapping = path->dentry->d_inode->i_mapping;
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file->f_mode = mode;
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file->f_op = fop;
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@@ -254,6 +255,7 @@ static void __fput(struct file *file)
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drop_file_write_access(file);
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file->f_path.dentry = NULL;
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file->f_path.mnt = NULL;
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+ file->f_inode = NULL;
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file_free(file);
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dput(dentry);
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mntput(mnt);
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diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
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index 3f716e9b896..2388e788e10 100644
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--- a/fs/open.c
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+++ b/fs/open.c
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@@ -673,6 +673,7 @@ static struct file *__dentry_open(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
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f->f_mode = FMODE_PATH;
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inode = dentry->d_inode;
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+ f->f_inode = dentry->d_inode;
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if (f->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
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error = __get_file_write_access(inode, mnt);
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if (error)
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@@ -748,6 +749,7 @@ cleanup_all:
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}
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f->f_path.dentry = NULL;
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f->f_path.mnt = NULL;
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+ f->f_inode = NULL;
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cleanup_file:
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put_filp(f);
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dput(dentry);
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diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
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index ef6e82ce1c1..11265501da0 100644
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--- a/include/linux/fs.h
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+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
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@@ -1029,6 +1029,7 @@ struct file {
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struct path f_path;
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#define f_dentry f_path.dentry
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#define f_vfsmnt f_path.mnt
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+ struct inode *f_inode; /* cached value */
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const struct file_operations *f_op;
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/*
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@@ -2304,6 +2305,12 @@ static inline bool execute_ok(struct inode *inode)
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return (inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO) || S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode);
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}
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+static inline struct inode *file_inode(struct file *f)
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+{
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+ /* return f->f_path.dentry->d_inode; / can also use this */
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+ return f->f_inode;
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+}
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+
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/*
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* get_write_access() gets write permission for a file.
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* put_write_access() releases this write permission.
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--
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2.20.1
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@ -0,0 +1,367 @@
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From 893282e935b9b1eb212eaf556843a47069e7d2a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
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Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2019 00:54:54 +0300
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Subject: [PATCH 2/5] shm: add sealing API
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If two processes share a common memory region, they usually want some
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guarantees to allow safe access. This often includes:
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- one side cannot overwrite data while the other reads it
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- one side cannot shrink the buffer while the other accesses it
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- one side cannot grow the buffer beyond previously set boundaries
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If there is a trust-relationship between both parties, there is no need
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for policy enforcement. However, if there's no trust relationship (eg.,
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for general-purpose IPC) sharing memory-regions is highly fragile and
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often not possible without local copies. Look at the following two
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use-cases:
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1) A graphics client wants to share its rendering-buffer with a
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graphics-server. The memory-region is allocated by the client for
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read/write access and a second FD is passed to the server. While
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scanning out from the memory region, the server has no guarantee that
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the client doesn't shrink the buffer at any time, requiring rather
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cumbersome SIGBUS handling.
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2) A process wants to perform an RPC on another process. To avoid huge
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bandwidth consumption, zero-copy is preferred. After a message is
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assembled in-memory and a FD is passed to the remote side, both sides
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want to be sure that neither modifies this shared copy, anymore. The
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source may have put sensible data into the message without a separate
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copy and the target may want to parse the message inline, to avoid a
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local copy.
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While SIGBUS handling, POSIX mandatory locking and MAP_DENYWRITE provide
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ways to achieve most of this, the first one is unproportionally ugly to
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use in libraries and the latter two are broken/racy or even disabled due
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to denial of service attacks.
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This patch introduces the concept of SEALING. If you seal a file, a
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specific set of operations is blocked on that file forever. Unlike locks,
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seals can only be set, never removed. Hence, once you verified a specific
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set of seals is set, you're guaranteed that no-one can perform the blocked
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operations on this file, anymore.
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An initial set of SEALS is introduced by this patch:
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- SHRINK: If SEAL_SHRINK is set, the file in question cannot be reduced
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in size. This affects ftruncate() and open(O_TRUNC).
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- GROW: If SEAL_GROW is set, the file in question cannot be increased
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in size. This affects ftruncate(), fallocate() and write().
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- WRITE: If SEAL_WRITE is set, no write operations (besides resizing)
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are possible. This affects fallocate(PUNCH_HOLE), mmap() and
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write().
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- SEAL: If SEAL_SEAL is set, no further seals can be added to a file.
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This basically prevents the F_ADD_SEAL operation on a file and
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can be set to prevent others from adding further seals that you
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don't want.
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The described use-cases can easily use these seals to provide safe use
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without any trust-relationship:
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1) The graphics server can verify that a passed file-descriptor has
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SEAL_SHRINK set. This allows safe scanout, while the client is
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allowed to increase buffer size for window-resizing on-the-fly.
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Concurrent writes are explicitly allowed.
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2) For general-purpose IPC, both processes can verify that SEAL_SHRINK,
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SEAL_GROW and SEAL_WRITE are set. This guarantees that neither
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process can modify the data while the other side parses it.
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Furthermore, it guarantees that even with writable FDs passed to the
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peer, it cannot increase the size to hit memory-limits of the source
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process (in case the file-storage is accounted to the source).
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The new API is an extension to fcntl(), adding two new commands:
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F_GET_SEALS: Return a bitset describing the seals on the file. This
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can be called on any FD if the underlying file supports
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sealing.
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F_ADD_SEALS: Change the seals of a given file. This requires WRITE
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access to the file and F_SEAL_SEAL may not already be set.
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Furthermore, the underlying file must support sealing and
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there may not be any existing shared mapping of that file.
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Otherwise, EBADF/EPERM is returned.
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The given seals are _added_ to the existing set of seals
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on the file. You cannot remove seals again.
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The fcntl() handler is currently specific to shmem and disabled on all
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files. A file needs to explicitly support sealing for this interface to
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work. A separate syscall is added in a follow-up, which creates files that
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support sealing. There is no intention to support this on other
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file-systems. Semantics are unclear for non-volatile files and we lack any
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use-case right now. Therefore, the implementation is specific to shmem.
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Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
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Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
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Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
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Cc: Ryan Lortie <desrt@desrt.ca>
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Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
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Cc: Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>
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Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
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Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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---
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fs/fcntl.c | 5 ++
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include/linux/fcntl.h | 16 +++++
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include/linux/shmem_fs.h | 18 ++++++
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mm/shmem.c | 122 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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4 files changed, 161 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/fs/fcntl.c b/fs/fcntl.c
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index b17b568001e..e660ffc9ac8 100644
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--- a/fs/fcntl.c
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+++ b/fs/fcntl.c
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@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
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#include <linux/signal.h>
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#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
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#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
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+#include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
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#include <asm/poll.h>
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#include <asm/siginfo.h>
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@@ -431,6 +432,10 @@ static long do_fcntl(int fd, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg,
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case F_GETPIPE_SZ:
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err = pipe_fcntl(filp, cmd, arg);
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break;
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+ case F_ADD_SEALS:
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+ case F_GET_SEALS:
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+ err = shmem_fcntl(filp, cmd, arg);
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+ break;
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default:
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break;
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}
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diff --git a/include/linux/fcntl.h b/include/linux/fcntl.h
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index f550f894ba1..2c39b178797 100644
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--- a/include/linux/fcntl.h
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+++ b/include/linux/fcntl.h
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@@ -27,6 +27,22 @@
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#define F_SETPIPE_SZ (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 7)
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#define F_GETPIPE_SZ (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 8)
|
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|
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+/*
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+ * Set/Get seals
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+ */
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+#define F_ADD_SEALS (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 9)
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+#define F_GET_SEALS (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 10)
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+
|
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+/*
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+ * Types of seals
|
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+ */
|
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+#define F_SEAL_SEAL 0x0001 /* prevent further seals from being set */
|
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+#define F_SEAL_SHRINK 0x0002 /* prevent file from shrinking */
|
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+#define F_SEAL_GROW 0x0004 /* prevent file from growing */
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+#define F_SEAL_WRITE 0x0008 /* prevent writes */
|
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+/* (1U << 31) is reserved for signed error codes */
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+
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+
|
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/*
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* Types of directory notifications that may be requested.
|
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*/
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diff --git a/include/linux/shmem_fs.h b/include/linux/shmem_fs.h
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index 79ab2555b3b..c08c0907bf5 100644
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--- a/include/linux/shmem_fs.h
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+++ b/include/linux/shmem_fs.h
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@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
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#ifndef __SHMEM_FS_H
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#define __SHMEM_FS_H
|
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+#include <linux/file.h>
|
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#include <linux/swap.h>
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#include <linux/mempolicy.h>
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#include <linux/pagemap.h>
|
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@@ -11,6 +12,7 @@
|
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struct shmem_inode_info {
|
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spinlock_t lock;
|
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unsigned long flags;
|
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+ unsigned int seals; /* shmem seals */
|
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unsigned long alloced; /* data pages alloced to file */
|
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union {
|
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unsigned long swapped; /* subtotal assigned to swap */
|
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@@ -61,4 +63,20 @@ static inline struct page *shmem_read_mapping_page(
|
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mapping_gfp_mask(mapping));
|
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}
|
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|
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+#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS
|
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+
|
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+extern int shmem_add_seals(struct file *file, unsigned int seals);
|
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+extern int shmem_get_seals(struct file *file);
|
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+extern long shmem_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
|
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+
|
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+#else
|
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+
|
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+static inline long shmem_fcntl(struct file *f, unsigned int c, unsigned long a)
|
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+{
|
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+ return -EINVAL;
|
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+}
|
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+
|
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+#endif
|
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+
|
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+
|
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#endif
|
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diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c
|
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index 788a30082a9..1a232f8d8cb 100644
|
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--- a/mm/shmem.c
|
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+++ b/mm/shmem.c
|
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@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ static struct vfsmount *shm_mnt;
|
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#include <linux/highmem.h>
|
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#include <linux/seq_file.h>
|
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#include <linux/magic.h>
|
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+#include <linux/fcntl.h>
|
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|
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#include <asm/uaccess.h>
|
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#include <asm/pgtable.h>
|
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@@ -560,6 +561,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(shmem_truncate_range);
|
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static int shmem_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
|
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{
|
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struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
|
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+ struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode);
|
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int error;
|
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|
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error = inode_change_ok(inode, attr);
|
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@@ -570,6 +572,11 @@ static int shmem_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
|
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loff_t oldsize = inode->i_size;
|
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loff_t newsize = attr->ia_size;
|
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|
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+ /* protected by i_mutex */
|
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+ if ((newsize < oldsize && (info->seals & F_SEAL_SHRINK)) ||
|
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+ (newsize > oldsize && (info->seals & F_SEAL_GROW)))
|
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+ return -EPERM;
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (newsize != oldsize) {
|
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i_size_write(inode, newsize);
|
||||
inode->i_ctime = inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
|
||||
@@ -1279,6 +1286,7 @@ static struct inode *shmem_get_inode(struct super_block *sb, const struct inode
|
||||
info = SHMEM_I(inode);
|
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memset(info, 0, (char *)inode - (char *)info);
|
||||
spin_lock_init(&info->lock);
|
||||
+ info->seals = F_SEAL_SEAL;
|
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info->flags = flags & VM_NORESERVE;
|
||||
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&info->swaplist);
|
||||
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&info->xattr_list);
|
||||
@@ -1332,7 +1340,17 @@ shmem_write_begin(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping,
|
||||
struct page **pagep, void **fsdata)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
|
||||
+ struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode);
|
||||
pgoff_t index = pos >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* i_mutex is held by caller */
|
||||
+ if (unlikely(info->seals)) {
|
||||
+ if (info->seals & F_SEAL_WRITE)
|
||||
+ return -EPERM;
|
||||
+ if ((info->seals & F_SEAL_GROW) && pos + len > inode->i_size)
|
||||
+ return -EPERM;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
return shmem_getpage(inode, index, pagep, SGP_WRITE, NULL);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1605,6 +1623,110 @@ static ssize_t shmem_file_splice_read(struct file *in, loff_t *ppos,
|
||||
return error;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+static int shmem_wait_for_pins(struct address_space *mapping)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#define F_ALL_SEALS (F_SEAL_SEAL | \
|
||||
+ F_SEAL_SHRINK | \
|
||||
+ F_SEAL_GROW | \
|
||||
+ F_SEAL_WRITE)
|
||||
+
|
||||
+int shmem_add_seals(struct file *file, unsigned int seals)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
|
||||
+ struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode);
|
||||
+ int error;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * SEALING
|
||||
+ * Sealing allows multiple parties to share a shmem-file but restrict
|
||||
+ * access to a specific subset of file operations. Seals can only be
|
||||
+ * added, but never removed. This way, mutually untrusted parties can
|
||||
+ * share common memory regions with a well-defined policy. A malicious
|
||||
+ * peer can thus never perform unwanted operations on a shared object.
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * Seals are only supported on special shmem-files and always affect
|
||||
+ * the whole underlying inode. Once a seal is set, it may prevent some
|
||||
+ * kinds of access to the file. Currently, the following seals are
|
||||
+ * defined:
|
||||
+ * SEAL_SEAL: Prevent further seals from being set on this file
|
||||
+ * SEAL_SHRINK: Prevent the file from shrinking
|
||||
+ * SEAL_GROW: Prevent the file from growing
|
||||
+ * SEAL_WRITE: Prevent write access to the file
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * As we don't require any trust relationship between two parties, we
|
||||
+ * must prevent seals from being removed. Therefore, sealing a file
|
||||
+ * only adds a given set of seals to the file, it never touches
|
||||
+ * existing seals. Furthermore, the "setting seals"-operation can be
|
||||
+ * sealed itself, which basically prevents any further seal from being
|
||||
+ * added.
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * Semantics of sealing are only defined on volatile files. Only
|
||||
+ * anonymous shmem files support sealing. More importantly, seals are
|
||||
+ * never written to disk. Therefore, there's no plan to support it on
|
||||
+ * other file types.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (file->f_op != &shmem_file_operations)
|
||||
+ return -EINVAL;
|
||||
+ if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
|
||||
+ return -EPERM;
|
||||
+ if (seals & ~(unsigned int)F_ALL_SEALS)
|
||||
+ return -EINVAL;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (info->seals & F_SEAL_SEAL) {
|
||||
+ error = -EPERM;
|
||||
+ goto unlock;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* TODO: this is the place to actually apply seals to
|
||||
+ * file->f_mapping, but this was not backported yet */
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ info->seals |= seals;
|
||||
+ error = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+unlock:
|
||||
+ mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
|
||||
+ return error;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(shmem_add_seals);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+int shmem_get_seals(struct file *file)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ if (file->f_op != &shmem_file_operations)
|
||||
+ return -EINVAL;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return SHMEM_I(file_inode(file))->seals;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(shmem_get_seals);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+long shmem_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ long error;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ switch (cmd) {
|
||||
+ case F_ADD_SEALS:
|
||||
+ /* disallow upper 32bit */
|
||||
+ if (arg > UINT_MAX)
|
||||
+ return -EINVAL;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ error = shmem_add_seals(file, arg);
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ case F_GET_SEALS:
|
||||
+ error = shmem_get_seals(file);
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ default:
|
||||
+ error = -EINVAL;
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return error;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
static int shmem_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstatfs *buf)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct shmem_sb_info *sbinfo = SHMEM_SB(dentry->d_sb);
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.20.1
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
|
|||
From 01fc0d7a8df67bd3a1f2cf7ffd5f74c6fadd7c85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2019 02:36:29 +0300
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 3/5] shm: add memfd_create() syscall
|
||||
|
||||
memfd_create() is similar to mmap(MAP_ANON), but returns a file-descriptor
|
||||
that you can pass to mmap(). It can support sealing and avoids any
|
||||
connection to user-visible mount-points. Thus, it's not subject to quotas
|
||||
on mounted file-systems, but can be used like malloc()'ed memory, but with
|
||||
a file-descriptor to it.
|
||||
|
||||
memfd_create() returns the raw shmem file, so calls like ftruncate() can
|
||||
be used to modify the underlying inode. Also calls like fstat() will
|
||||
return proper information and mark the file as regular file. If you want
|
||||
sealing, you can specify MFD_ALLOW_SEALING. Otherwise, sealing is not
|
||||
supported (like on all other regular files).
|
||||
|
||||
Compared to O_TMPFILE, it does not require a tmpfs mount-point and is not
|
||||
subject to a filesystem size limit. It is still properly accounted to
|
||||
memcg limits, though, and to the same overcommit or no-overcommit
|
||||
accounting as all user memory.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
|
||||
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
|
||||
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
|
||||
Cc: Ryan Lortie <desrt@desrt.ca>
|
||||
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
|
||||
Cc: Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>
|
||||
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
||||
---
|
||||
arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 2 +
|
||||
arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 2 +
|
||||
include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 +
|
||||
include/uapi/linux/memfd.h | 8 ++++
|
||||
kernel/sys_ni.c | 1 +
|
||||
mm/shmem.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||||
6 files changed, 88 insertions(+)
|
||||
create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/memfd.h
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
|
||||
index 64e55260fbc..498d12b9af8 100644
|
||||
--- a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
|
||||
+++ b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
|
||||
@@ -356,3 +356,5 @@
|
||||
347 i386 process_vm_readv sys_process_vm_readv compat_sys_process_vm_readv
|
||||
348 i386 process_vm_writev sys_process_vm_writev compat_sys_process_vm_writev
|
||||
354 i386 seccomp sys_seccomp
|
||||
+# 355 i386 getrandom sys_getrandom
|
||||
+356 i386 memfd_create sys_memfd_create
|
||||
diff --git a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
|
||||
index 33335d11d7b..4887a0fa042 100644
|
||||
--- a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
|
||||
+++ b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
|
||||
@@ -319,6 +319,8 @@
|
||||
310 64 process_vm_readv sys_process_vm_readv
|
||||
311 64 process_vm_writev sys_process_vm_writev
|
||||
317 common seccomp sys_seccomp
|
||||
+# 318 common getrandom sys_getrandom
|
||||
+319 common memfd_create sys_memfd_create
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact
|
||||
diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
|
||||
index da352d5a271..c1cc0e12cf4 100644
|
||||
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
|
||||
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
|
||||
@@ -813,6 +813,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_timerfd_settime(int ufd, int flags,
|
||||
asmlinkage long sys_timerfd_gettime(int ufd, struct itimerspec __user *otmr);
|
||||
asmlinkage long sys_eventfd(unsigned int count);
|
||||
asmlinkage long sys_eventfd2(unsigned int count, int flags);
|
||||
+asmlinkage long sys_memfd_create(const char __user *uname_ptr, unsigned int flags);
|
||||
asmlinkage long sys_fallocate(int fd, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len);
|
||||
asmlinkage long sys_old_readdir(unsigned int, struct old_linux_dirent __user *, unsigned int);
|
||||
asmlinkage long sys_pselect6(int, fd_set __user *, fd_set __user *,
|
||||
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h b/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h
|
||||
new file mode 100644
|
||||
index 00000000000..9a772654307
|
||||
--- /dev/null
|
||||
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
|
||||
+#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_MEMFD_H
|
||||
+#define _UAPI_LINUX_MEMFD_H
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/* flags for memfd_create(2) (unsigned int) */
|
||||
+#define MFD_CLOEXEC 0x0001U
|
||||
+#define MFD_ALLOW_SEALING 0x0002U
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_MEMFD_H */
|
||||
diff --git a/kernel/sys_ni.c b/kernel/sys_ni.c
|
||||
index 026f30a8985..b97ab3a6dc9 100644
|
||||
--- a/kernel/sys_ni.c
|
||||
+++ b/kernel/sys_ni.c
|
||||
@@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ cond_syscall(compat_sys_timerfd_settime);
|
||||
cond_syscall(compat_sys_timerfd_gettime);
|
||||
cond_syscall(sys_eventfd);
|
||||
cond_syscall(sys_eventfd2);
|
||||
+cond_syscall(sys_memfd_create);
|
||||
|
||||
/* performance counters: */
|
||||
cond_syscall(sys_perf_event_open);
|
||||
diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c
|
||||
index 1a232f8d8cb..3b9580b0808 100644
|
||||
--- a/mm/shmem.c
|
||||
+++ b/mm/shmem.c
|
||||
@@ -63,7 +63,9 @@ static struct vfsmount *shm_mnt;
|
||||
#include <linux/highmem.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/magic.h>
|
||||
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/fcntl.h>
|
||||
+#include <uapi/linux/memfd.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
|
||||
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
|
||||
@@ -2492,6 +2494,78 @@ static int shmem_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root)
|
||||
shmem_show_mpol(seq, sbinfo->mpol);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#define MFD_NAME_PREFIX "memfd:"
|
||||
+#define MFD_NAME_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof(MFD_NAME_PREFIX) - 1)
|
||||
+#define MFD_NAME_MAX_LEN (NAME_MAX - MFD_NAME_PREFIX_LEN)
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#define MFD_ALL_FLAGS (MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING)
|
||||
+
|
||||
+SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create,
|
||||
+ const char __user *, uname,
|
||||
+ unsigned int, flags)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ struct shmem_inode_info *info;
|
||||
+ struct file *file;
|
||||
+ int fd, error;
|
||||
+ char *name;
|
||||
+ long len;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (flags & ~(unsigned int)MFD_ALL_FLAGS)
|
||||
+ return -EINVAL;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* length includes terminating zero */
|
||||
+ len = strnlen_user(uname, MFD_NAME_MAX_LEN + 1);
|
||||
+ if (len <= 0)
|
||||
+ return -EFAULT;
|
||||
+ if (len > MFD_NAME_MAX_LEN + 1)
|
||||
+ return -EINVAL;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ name = kmalloc(len + MFD_NAME_PREFIX_LEN, GFP_TEMPORARY);
|
||||
+ if (!name)
|
||||
+ return -ENOMEM;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ strcpy(name, MFD_NAME_PREFIX);
|
||||
+ if (copy_from_user(&name[MFD_NAME_PREFIX_LEN], uname, len)) {
|
||||
+ error = -EFAULT;
|
||||
+ goto err_name;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* terminating-zero may have changed after strnlen_user() returned */
|
||||
+ if (name[len + MFD_NAME_PREFIX_LEN - 1]) {
|
||||
+ error = -EFAULT;
|
||||
+ goto err_name;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ fd = get_unused_fd_flags((flags & MFD_CLOEXEC) ? O_CLOEXEC : 0);
|
||||
+ if (fd < 0) {
|
||||
+ error = fd;
|
||||
+ goto err_name;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ file = shmem_file_setup(name, 0, VM_NORESERVE);
|
||||
+ if (IS_ERR(file)) {
|
||||
+ error = PTR_ERR(file);
|
||||
+ goto err_fd;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ info = SHMEM_I(file_inode(file));
|
||||
+ file->f_mode |= FMODE_LSEEK | FMODE_PREAD | FMODE_PWRITE;
|
||||
+ file->f_flags |= O_RDWR | O_LARGEFILE;
|
||||
+ if (flags & MFD_ALLOW_SEALING)
|
||||
+ info->seals &= ~F_SEAL_SEAL;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ fd_install(fd, file);
|
||||
+ kfree(name);
|
||||
+ return fd;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+err_fd:
|
||||
+ put_unused_fd(fd);
|
||||
+err_name:
|
||||
+ kfree(name);
|
||||
+ return error;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
#endif /* CONFIG_TMPFS */
|
||||
|
||||
static void shmem_put_super(struct super_block *sb)
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.20.1
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
|
|||
From b307cbc85399f0aeee3747e1ace50ca036f77c96 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2019 02:47:26 +0300
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 4/5] asm-generic: add memfd_create system call to unistd.h
|
||||
|
||||
Commit 9183df25fe7b ("shm: add memfd_create() syscall") added a new
|
||||
system call (memfd_create) but didn't update the asm-generic unistd
|
||||
header.
|
||||
|
||||
This patch adds the new system call to the asm-generic version of
|
||||
unistd.h so that it can be used by architectures such as arm64.
|
||||
|
||||
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
include/asm-generic/unistd.h | 6 +++++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/unistd.h b/include/asm-generic/unistd.h
|
||||
index ae8513b32af..a4fafc379f5 100644
|
||||
--- a/include/asm-generic/unistd.h
|
||||
+++ b/include/asm-generic/unistd.h
|
||||
@@ -693,9 +693,13 @@ __SC_COMP(__NR_process_vm_writev, sys_process_vm_writev, \
|
||||
compat_sys_process_vm_writev)
|
||||
#define __NR_seccomp 277
|
||||
__SYSCALL(__NR_seccomp, sys_seccomp)
|
||||
+/*#define __NR_getrandom 278
|
||||
+__SYSCALL(__NR_getrandom, sys_getrandom) unfortunately getrandom is not backported yet */
|
||||
+#define __NR_memfd_create 279
|
||||
+__SYSCALL(__NR_memfd_create, sys_memfd_create)
|
||||
|
||||
#undef __NR_syscalls
|
||||
-#define __NR_syscalls 278
|
||||
+#define __NR_syscalls 280
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* All syscalls below here should go away really,
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.20.1
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
|||
From c4dd412e68ccbe2e759d6517e902a6f3e7d8f700 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2019 02:57:25 +0300
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 5/5] ARM: wire up memfd_create syscall
|
||||
|
||||
Add the memfd_create syscall to ARM.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
|
||||
---
|
||||
arch/arm/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 ++
|
||||
arch/arm/kernel/calls.S | 2 ++
|
||||
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/unistd.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/unistd.h
|
||||
index 6ef9635a174..9b81e87e683 100644
|
||||
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/unistd.h
|
||||
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/unistd.h
|
||||
@@ -405,6 +405,8 @@
|
||||
#define __NR_process_vm_readv (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+376)
|
||||
#define __NR_process_vm_writev (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+377)
|
||||
#define __NR_seccomp (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+383)
|
||||
+/*#define __NR_getrandom (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+384) not ported yet */
|
||||
+#define __NR_memfd_create (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+385)
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* The following SWIs are ARM private.
|
||||
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/calls.S b/arch/arm/kernel/calls.S
|
||||
index d01eb013b0a..957e262aa86 100644
|
||||
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/calls.S
|
||||
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/calls.S
|
||||
@@ -393,6 +393,8 @@
|
||||
CALL(sys_ni_syscall)
|
||||
CALL(sys_ni_syscall)
|
||||
CALL(sys_seccomp)
|
||||
+ CALL(sys_ni_syscall) /* no sys_getrandom yet */
|
||||
+/* 385 */ CALL(sys_memfd_create)
|
||||
#ifndef syscalls_counted
|
||||
.equ syscalls_padding, ((NR_syscalls + 3) & ~3) - NR_syscalls
|
||||
#define syscalls_counted
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.20.1
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
|
|||
|
||||
pkgname="linux-samsung-klte"
|
||||
pkgver=3.4.113
|
||||
pkgrel=4
|
||||
pkgrel=5
|
||||
pkgdesc="Samsung Galaxy S5 kernel fork"
|
||||
arch="armv7"
|
||||
_carch="arm"
|
||||
|
|
@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ fi
|
|||
|
||||
# Source
|
||||
_repository="android_kernel_samsung_msm8974"
|
||||
_commit="b6614591549c558e0712f964c390cb25cf7be20f"
|
||||
_commit="edfd9dd9be89d15c34f653363a9a3c9108146ca0"
|
||||
_config="config-${_flavor}.${arch}"
|
||||
source="
|
||||
$pkgname-$_commit.tar.gz::https://github.com/LineageOS/${_repository}/archive/${_commit}.tar.gz
|
||||
|
|
@ -37,7 +37,13 @@ source="
|
|||
0006-Fix-xt_connbytes-compile-warning.patch
|
||||
0007-usb_gadget-set-random-rndis-host-MAC-address-to-prev.patch
|
||||
0008-Backport-vfs-make-O_PATH-file-descriptors-usable-for.patch
|
||||
0009-Backport-cache-the-value-of-file_inode-in-struct-file.patch
|
||||
0010-Backport-shm-add-sealing-API.patch
|
||||
0011-Backport-shm-add-memfd_create-syscall.patch
|
||||
0012-Backport-asm-generic-add-memfd_create-system-call-to-unistd.h.patch
|
||||
0013-Backport-ARM-wire-up-memfd_create-syscall.patch
|
||||
"
|
||||
|
||||
builddir="$srcdir/${_repository}-${_commit}"
|
||||
|
||||
prepare() {
|
||||
|
|
@ -84,7 +90,7 @@ package() {
|
|||
INSTALL_MOD_PATH="$pkgdir" modules_install
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
sha512sums="3947d670fb3bf9cc3f47be2b13eca0fc2317ad5ab23ba4236cea2642e3e599f638a5f667cbe723d912d14777754ca52b50acb3c1fac932ea90bca2d630de4e67 linux-samsung-klte-b6614591549c558e0712f964c390cb25cf7be20f.tar.gz
|
||||
sha512sums="d0ccc0cde26e6cad7e2b4cffa9d92b4cd7d11e159738935d87cc044a07679e7aed891379fb0e096b12cd1ba7e1855dd72c94ec6da96ff8e936479c59b4d4eb6c linux-samsung-klte-edfd9dd9be89d15c34f653363a9a3c9108146ca0.tar.gz
|
||||
2e660d0ac4ffdd5f1a63660a8b61cf83e94122f15126b134a27f58b84fc5424ce4935ef43ca5bff1ec956047b77f7fb7f67e5c1ec976c67712444b370ae6373e config-samsung-klte.armv7
|
||||
3b4913415bcfe0ff222969f993890c656c7e12b6ee06532bded485d5201c9855b2c87996c5b63423702b89b6b0ca214b5aceeb402571d9c5af084093c157ccb4 0001_fix_return_address.patch
|
||||
0fc4b1782dfd3bd94fa9ae8ab74b19713f25e9f4a48dcf830072634f247aa3dd8847f001a3e87e9728e057657efd4ae751510e7c408d9b960c907665ca64e61f 0002_gpu-msm-fix-gcc5-compile.patch
|
||||
|
|
@ -93,4 +99,9 @@ a48336bbfead6ad0c84d2fce0c40a3f5530aebdff356a6835cceaf59a50a6f860d2f8027703a9292
|
|||
e3a9b75de461313ee6ba0e547d7fb97d77a749a11416c44b28110673d3a6f7b01305e74f67c06c8cfea97bde5d3d0cd98a457a03a63560125f5bb84f82f116e1 0005-mdss_fb-Always-allow-to-allocate-map-framebuffer-mem.patch
|
||||
6bdb3acd4a2d10d59ea16a2147735b94f17070aecebfe55fff724c03335bf1a02cc7539c9fe0a59cb944b6835135fe64956617c8b29847397b2f4df68b602063 0006-Fix-xt_connbytes-compile-warning.patch
|
||||
27f890cf82027649ba742b606a87ce6a82f9685b075bb7b50bffec77221e70434ee78d118d39048350537c5ecdad208658967e492eeeb997e7f6884fa78ac696 0007-usb_gadget-set-random-rndis-host-MAC-address-to-prev.patch
|
||||
a2bd1b925ba0e1ba0a68dcb134604abbaddf456426a468662d77bc02f0d09d4d07c0c89001c0973e690e1f7eb9c1cfdd37c2d99ed4cc62f3398582d6b51a7013 0008-Backport-vfs-make-O_PATH-file-descriptors-usable-for.patch"
|
||||
a2bd1b925ba0e1ba0a68dcb134604abbaddf456426a468662d77bc02f0d09d4d07c0c89001c0973e690e1f7eb9c1cfdd37c2d99ed4cc62f3398582d6b51a7013 0008-Backport-vfs-make-O_PATH-file-descriptors-usable-for.patch
|
||||
47894281412f1c9d4266812f089c3f2434c1636d74245f392d4b0b7532096f8f5bd698715d9e10c7be6c70892af45de2d2c657bd276332442890b94e1159f8f8 0009-Backport-cache-the-value-of-file_inode-in-struct-file.patch
|
||||
54d71b32b456a3d0abd090c820214240688484f4cadbbde0304bf3cb5246b1aa3893dd85736dc5db2f3d6f9de1f5e84a1adcf5a661a62586452f1002360dc691 0010-Backport-shm-add-sealing-API.patch
|
||||
c62d67a5fb28082e86a585b4c64891525db640ce694445f0fb19e67fb8dcd9ccbfbcb6fba8692964fac8b026c39cfa558cf316a7e22828ac13f58f5b9938ef09 0011-Backport-shm-add-memfd_create-syscall.patch
|
||||
cbf6e4bdf53b02f897923d0f6eea5320acc6760c3f3ed762e69928ced7e3b6f2a5355df4a2fccf560f010a4a1968e7ae1a3f62c2db299857d6bcc9715d932822 0012-Backport-asm-generic-add-memfd_create-system-call-to-unistd.h.patch
|
||||
2f256f6ec9fa7b240dd1f9417622bfd5a8ca4a9ea12cd2ef171540e1425d4171122c0597fe12af913ef60979ef9a3dce8a6c1c523c91020cb9481560901cc92b 0013-Backport-ARM-wire-up-memfd_create-syscall.patch"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user